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NOTES
SHOPLIFTING-AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CONTROLS
Shoplifting, the popular term for larceny in a store, is a crime that
is apparently on the increase throughout the United States.' This type
of larceny, a felony in Indiana,2 is defined as a wrongful taking of mer-
chandise held for sale with the intent to permanently deprive the owner
of possession.3 The increase in the commission of the crime, the diver-
sification of the groups affected, and the problems inherent in a legisla-
tive attempt at control prompts an investigation of the crime, the crimi-
nals, the victims, and the possible remedies.4
To sustain a conviction each element of the crime of larceny must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.5 Theoretically, proof of these
1. During the year 1954, major crimes were up 5%, establishing a new high estimate
of 2,267,250 major crimes for 1954. The rise in the seventh straight year was due to
increases in robberies, up 6.8%, burglaries, up 8.4%, and larcenies, up 5.8%. F.B.I. UN.
CRIME REP. vol. xxv pt. 2 at 67 (1955). Total larcenies in Indiana excluding auto theft
(80 cities reporting) numbered 22,524 in 1953, and 22,637 in 1954, id. at 78. Of the
Indiana cities reporting, Bloomington reported 395, Evansville, 1,578; Fort Wayne,
1,308; Gary, 2,056; Hammond, 1,491; Indianapolis, 5,005; Lafayette, 604; Terre Haute,
722. Table 35, id. at 98. While the overall rise in larcenies was 4.5% in 409 cities
of over 25,000, shoplifting jumped 11.4%. In 1953, there were 23,666 shoplifting crimes
reported; in 1954, 26,353. Table 37, id. at 108. These figures are valuable for long-term
trend study, but admittedly do not reflect incidence accurately.
2. All crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the state are felonies in
Indiana. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-101 (Burns 1946) ; Short v. State, 63 Ind. 376 (1878) ;
Barnhart v. State, 154 Ind. 177, 56 N.E. 212 (1899) (petit larceny) ; Gow v. State,
224 Ind. 519, 69 N.E.2d 175 (1946) (grand larceny). Grand larceny, the theft of goods
of the value of $25.00 or upwards is punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, disfranchisement and imprisonment from one to ten years. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 10-3001 (Burns 1946). Petit larceny, the theft of goods of less than $25.00 value,
is punishable either as a felony or a misdemeanor. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3002 (Burns
1946).
3. Currier v. State, 157 Ind. 114, 60 N.E. 1023 (1901) ; Robinson v. State, 113 Ind.
510, 16 N.E. 184 (1888).
4. The Indiana Law Journal has conducted a survey among Indiana retail merchants
and enforcement officials in an attempt to gather basic data concerning: (1) the incidence
of shoplifting, (2) the intensity of the problem among the various types of retail estab-
lishments, (3) the need and desire for regulation. Eight hundred and thirty-nine ques-
tionnaires were sent to retail merchants, and 278 returns were received, equaling a 33%
return. One hundred questionnaires were sent to Indiana police chiefs of which 40 were
returned, equaling a 40% return. The cities polled included those in every population
class and the polling was dispersed geographically. Reference to survey returns, inter-
views, and correspondence will be by type. Specific names and addresses, whether
corporate or personal will remain confidential, and are on file in the office of the
Indiana Law Journal.
5. The prohibited conduct exists in feloniously taking and carrying away the
personal goods of another. Davis v. State, 232 Ind. 272, 112 N.E.2d 215 (1952); Still-
well v. State, 155 Ind. 552, 58 N.E. 709 (1900) ; Robinson v. State, 113 Ind. 510, 16 N.E.
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elements would not appear difficult; practically, proof is quite difficult.
The interplay of circumstances about the crowded marketplace, the swift-
ness of the crime, and the prevalent lack of knowledge among retailers as
to what constitutes legal evidence, leads stores to exercise a peculiar re-
straint in arresting shoplifters.' The reason for the restraint is the fear
of civil action for false arrest,7 slander,8 or similar actions9 brought on
behalf of those customers mistakenly accused."0
One of the elements of the crime, intent, actually subjective in
184 (1888) ; McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. (Tanner) 39 (1859). The necessary felonious
intent is connoted by the word "steal" contained in IND. ANN. STATS. §§ 10-3001, 10-3002
(Burns 1946). Gow v. State, 224 Ind. 519, 69 N.E.2d 175 (1946) (Upholding the
constitutionality of Section 10-3001 on this point.) An intention permanently to deprive
the property owner of possession imports the felonious quality to the conduct; but
formerly an intention to convert the property to the use and benefit of the thief was also
necessary. Reg. v. Jones, 2 Car. & K. 236, 175 Eng. Rep. 98 (1838). The necessity
of lucri causa or base motive of greed, is non-essential in Indiana. Best v. State, 155
Ind. 46, 57 N.E. 534 (1900) ; Keely v. State, 14 Ind. (Tanner) 36 (1859) ; See 2 BISHOP,
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 842-848 (9th ed. 1923); CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES
§ 332 (5th ed. Kearney 1952). The goods taken must also be "personal." Haskins v. Tar-
rance, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 417 (1840) ; HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY, at 80-109 (2nd ed.
1952). These goods must be wrongfully taken. Barnhart v. State, 154 Ind. 177, 56 N.E.
212 (1899). Such a taking as would support an action for trespass de bonis asportatis will
complete the crime; but the slightest asportation accompanied by the intent to dispossess
is all that is required. Currier v. State, 157 Ind. 114, 60 N.E. 1023 (1901) ; Warnke v.
State, 89 Ind. App. 683, 167 N.E. 138 (1929). Umphrey v. State, 63 Ind. 223 (1878).
Similarly, one taking goods under a sincere belief that title is in him does not commit
larceny. Baugh v. State, 200 Ind. 585, 165 N.E. 434 (1929). See Note, 4 InD. L.J. 551
(1929).
6. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
7. See e.g. Montgomery Ward v. Fogle, 221 Ind. 597, 50 N.E.2d 871 (1943)
(false imprisonment); Efroymson v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451, 63 N.E. 328 (1902)
(false imprisonment); L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Harmon, 56 Ind. App. 436, 104 N.E. 315
(1914) (false arrest). Roberson v. J.C. Penny Co., 288 P.2d 275 (Cal. 1955) ; Mont-
gomery Ward v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952); Aldrich v. Fox, 238 Ill. App.
96, 108 N.E.2d 139 (1952) ; Safeway Stores v. Gibson, 118 A.2d 386 (D.C. Mun. ct. 1952) ;
Lester v. Albers Super Mkt., 94 Ohio App. 313, 115 N.E.2d 529 (1948) ; Titus v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 232 Mo. App. 987, 123 S.W.2d 574 (1938); Lewis v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 144 Kans. 656, 62 P.2d 875 (1936).
8. Alley v. Neely, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 200 (1839) ; Becket v. Sterrett, 4 Blackf. (Ind.)
499 (1838); Writesman v. Pettis Dry Goods, 82 Ind. App. 504, 146 N.E. 835 (1925)
(slander by corporate servant). For decisions of other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Little
Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 351, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943) ; Williams v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 337 Pa. 67, 10 A.2d 8 (1940) ; Merrit v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 179 S.C. 474, 184 S.E. 145 (1936) ; Lily v. Belk's Dept. Store, 178 S.C. 278,
182 S.E. 889 (1935) ; Dean v. Black & White Stores, 186 Ark. 667, 55 S.W.2d 500 (1932).
9. Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N.E. 506 (1893) (assault) ; Indiana Bicycle
Co. v. Willis, 18 Ind. App. 525, 48 N. E. 646 (1897) (malicious prosecution).
10. The police feel that merchants are too hesitant in reporting. Consequently only
a small percentage of the thefts actually occurring come to police attention. In a
medium sized city three youths were arrested with over $1,000 worth of goods that had
been shoplifted in the community. Of this, $19.75 worth of goods had been reported
stolen. Return #5, Police Survey. Twice as many merchants report hesitation because
of the fear of liability rather than the loss of good will. Only in drug stores is loss
of good will the major factor. Merchant Survey.
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nature, must be inferred from the overt acts of the accused." Customers
who pick up merchandise from a counter and subsequently wander about
the store, place the merchant in a dilemma as to whether to infer from
such an act an intent to steal,12 or to infer a mere desire to examine the
article in a natural light.'" As a consequence, merchants generally per-
mit such customers to leave the store before apprehension, 4 believing it
much easier to convince a hostile jury that a larceny has been committed
when the accused has been found in possession of an unsold article out-
side the store. 5 Larger stores that employ store detectives provide the
exception to this tendency; store protection agents prefer to apprehend
immediately upon the taking, particularly in the case of a known shop-
lifter.'6 The store protection trade believes that concealment of unpaid-
for merchandise is a reliable basis for proof of the intent to steal. If
the shopper carries goods in such a manner that they remain visible to the
clerks, then the shopper will not be detained until an exit is reached. In
either case unless the store detective acts immediately upon becoming con-
vinced that his suspicions are well founded, the vital evidence of goods in
possession may be lost;"7 accomplished shoplifters are quick to sense sur-
11. Davis v. State, 232 Ind. 272, 112 N.E.2d 215 (1952); Mattingly v. State, 230
Ind. 431, 104 N.E. 2d 721 (1952); Malone v. State, 169 Ind. 72, 81 N.E. 1099 (1907).
12. An entrapment routine is often employed to bait an unwary merchant into taking
steps which may become the basis for a lucrative action for damages. The sham cus-
tomer buys an article and obtains a sales slip. Later the customer surreptitiously replaces
the article on a counter. While a clerk watches, the perpetrator retakes the article
and secretes it. When apprehended, the customer protests his innocence in loud tones
of outrage, hoping to evoke forceful quieting action on the part of the store agent. Then,
after having been accused of theft (slander) or touched (battery) or prevented from
leaving (false imprisonment), the suspect triumphantly produces the sales slip for the
article and the entrapment is complete. This and much other useful information was
gathered in interviews with various store protection agents at Indianapolis, Mar. 10,
1956, April 7, 1956; Evansville, April 28, 1956 (hereinafter cited as Interviews, Store
Detective).
13. Customers often wish to examine colors and texture by daylight, or carry the
article to an available clerk to pay for it, or ask someone's advice as to the prospective
purchase. Interview, Store Detective. E.g. Efroymson v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451, 63
N.E. 328 (1902) (mother seeking daughter's advice).
14. Merchant Survey. This tendency perhaps has its foundation in the distinction
between the retention and the recaption of property. See note 93 infra and accompanying
text.
15. Martin v. State, 148 Ind. 519, 47 N.E. 930 (1897). See also, MINN. RETAIL
FEDERATION, You CAN Do SOMETHING AaOUT SHOPLIFTING 33-34 (3rd printing 1955).
16. Interviews, Store Detective.
17. Ibid. Success as a store detective depends primarily upon the exercise of sound
judgment and a long memory. The distinction between normal shopping conduct and
criminal conduct can come to be sensed through experience. Once the decision to act
is made, the store detective's first move is to the place of concealment of the article,
at the same time propelling the suspect to the privacy of an office. There an effort
is made toward obtaining a signed confession of the theft.
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veillance and quicker to "ditch" stolen merchandise when detection is
imminent."
In Indiana the concealment of articles has been held, in some in-
stances, to be sufficient evidence of intent to sustain a conviction for
larceny,'9 and an inference of guilt may be drawn from the possession of
recently stolen merchandise.2" Further, the movement of the article
necessary to constitute larceny is slight." Courts in other jurisdictions
have held, in cases dealing specifically with concealment and subsequent
movement about a store, that such conduct would constitute either an
attempt to commit larceny, or a larceny." The crime has been success-
fully prosecuted even though the criminal did not leave the premises of
the store and the movement of the article within the store was slight,
apparently on the basis that the fact of concealment was enough to clarify
the equivocal nature of the taking."
Hardships of proof certainly act as a salutary deterrent upon mer-
chant action of an accusatory nature; but merchants perhaps restrict
themselves too much, as far as proof of the crime is concerned, by
adopting rigid policies allowing all suspected customers to leave the store
before apprehension. Storeowners primarily hesitate to detain within
the store because the price of detaining an innocent shopper may be an
action based upon false arrest, slander, assault and battery, or all three. 4
The store itself, as a corporate entity, is liable through the principles of
agency for most of the acts of its personnel." Furthermore, stores are
18. See People v. Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560 (1943) (unsuccessful
attempt to ditch).
19. Currier v. State, 157 Ind. 114, 60 N.E. 1023 (1901).
20. Selby v. State, 189 Ind. 459, 128 N.E. (1920) ; Johnson v. State, 148 Ind. 522,
47 N.E. 926 (1897).
21. Warnke v. State, 89 Ind. App. 683, 167 N.E. 138 (1929).
22. People v. Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560 (1943) ; People v. Baker,
365 Ill. 328, 6 N.E.2d 665 (1937) ; Boatright v. State, 121 Tenn. Crim. Rep. 578, 51 S.S.2d
311 (1932) ; People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N.E. 375 (1921).
23. People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N.E. 375 (1921) (concealing a comb in a
coat and laying the coat aside) ; People v. Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9N.W.2d 560 (1943)
(putting on clothing and attempting to leave the floor).
24. See notes 7, 8, 9, supra. But in Indiana, the vast majority of stores polled had
never been sued. The ones that had were the large chains. Merchant Survey.
25. RESTATEMIENT, AGENCY § 245 (1933). Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Paddock,
219 Ind. 675, 40 N.E.2d 697 (1941). The test of the principal's liability is whether the
agent when committing the tort was acting within the general scope of his employment.
Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N.E. 506 (1893) ; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Weddle,
100 Ind. 138 (1884) ; Evansville & Terre Haute R.R. Co. v. McKee, 99 Ind. 519 (1884) ;
American Express Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 430 (1881). It makes no difference if the
act of the agent was willful and not directly authorized by the principal. Ibid. The pro-
tection of the owner's property is considered part of a store clerk's general duties. Dick-
son v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 523, 34 N.E. 506, 511 (1893). The scope of employment
is not limited to the store premises and therefore the store may be liable when a clerk
stops a suspect outside the store. Montgomery Ward v. Fogle, 221 Ind. 597, 50 N.E.2d
871 (1943). L. S. Ayres v. Harmon, 56 Ind. App. 436, 104 N.E. 315 (1914).
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understandably reluctant to face a jury possibly hostile to corporate de-
fendants and empowered to weigh the nebulous factors of delay in busi-
ness, mental anguish, and injuries to private repute in assessing damages.
Therefore to avoid the risks of litigation inherent in a policy of appre-
hension and detention of suspected shoplifters, the stores' efforts are
largely focused on methods of preventive self-help.2" By conveniently
placed mirrors, well arranged counters, and attentive clerks, the oppor-
tunities for theft are minimized." Further, even where there has been
a clear case of theft, a detention may generally be made only by those
store personnel employed in a managerial or investigatory capacity,
whether the apprehension is made within or without the store premises.28
Courts are inclined to consider any detention by a private citizen as
an attempt on his part to exercise rights of a public nature in arrest,29 in
preference to the view that such a detention was an exercise of a factually
similar privilege of defense or recaption of property." This judicial at-
titude may have developed from recognition of narrowed powers of
26. Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875 (1902). When malice is proved,
or the action was taken in a willful or wanton manner or with a reckless disregard
for the rights of the complaining party, exemplary damages may be had. Ibid.
27. Two way mirrors, peepholes, pattern counter arrangements, alarms, cameras,
uniformed police and secured counters are common throughout larger stores, Mer-
chants Survey; but there is no substitute for the preventive effect of an attentive clerk.
Interview, Store Detective. For a particularly interesting discussion of preventive
measures, see CHICAGO RETAIL MERCHANTS Assoc., CLINIC ON SHOPLIFTING 15-19
(March 15, 1954). Preventive measures are taken by over 85% of the stores polled.
These include drug, dept., sporting goods, jewelry, specialty and novelty stores. Pro-
grams ranging from formal class room work to on-the-job suggestions are utilized to
instruct clerks in their duties upon arousal of suspicion, generally to summon a super-
visor, and in methods of detection.
28. The restriction is attributable to the turnover of store personnel and the result-
ing lack of experience. Other restrictions take the form of dollar limits for which a
suspect will be detained for arrest. One large chain will not have a customer arrested
if the items taken were less than eight dollars in value. Letter from a chain store
executive to the Indiana Law Journal on file in the office of the Indiana Law Journal.
29. "Arrest is the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer
for a public offense." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1004 (Burns 1956). An arrest is made
by an actual restraint of the person, of by his submission to the custody of the officer,
but the person shall be subject to no more restraint than is necessary for his arrest
and detention. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1005 (Burns 1956). The privilege of arrest for a
felony carries with it the privilege of using reasonable force, even to the point of deadly
force if necessary to effect the arrest. Plummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 N.E. 968
(1893).
30. "One in possession of real or personal property is privileged to defend it by the
use of force which reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent a threatened inter-
ference with the possession." PROSSER, TORTS § 21 (2nd ed. 1955) (defense of property) ;
"If property is taken wrongfully, and the pursuit is fresh, the owner may use reasonable
force to recover it which otherwise would amount to false imprisonment." Id. at 103.
(reception of property) ; RESTATEMENT TORTS § 87 (1934) (defense) ; id. at §§ 100-
111(recaption). See also BRANSTON, The Forcible Recaption of Chattels, 28 L. Q.
REV. 262 (1912) ; Notes, 46 ILL. L. REV. 887 (1951), 47 ILL. L. REv. 82 (1952).
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private arrest resulting from the growth of municipal police forces3 and
a belief that the rights of the individual are best protected against the
arbitrary exercise of government power by an early judicial evaluation
of the necessity for initiating official action.32 However, in certain in-
stances, the law recognizes that necessity may make compliance with the
preferred procedure either impracticable or impossible.3 In most of
such cases,34 the officer is but a conduit to the liability which falls upon
the informant.3" But if the information is not offered as a charge of
the crime, but merely as a basis upon which the officer can determine for
himself whether to make the arrest or not, then the informant does not
assume the responsibility for the arrest and the officer himself must sup-
ply proof of the reasonableness of the arrest.36
31. At common-law the posse comitatus made up of the citizenry was the major
means of initial arrest and apprehension. Subsequent to the organization of a municipal-
type of police agency by Sir Robert Peel, which followed the success of certain private
agencies, the powers of the private citizen to arrest for certain types of offenses
(principally misdemeanors) diminished. The citizen is now expected to follow prescribed
procedures for effecting a legitimate arrest. HALL, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest
Without a Warrant, 49 HARv. L. REv. 566 (1936).
32. "The value of personal liberty is too great to permit the detention of a suspected
fugitive on the judgment of a ministerial or peace officer, and without a hearing judicial
in nature." Simmons v. VanDyke, 138 Ind. 380, 384, 37 N.E. 973, 974 (1894).
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1001 (Burns 1956) (issuance of warrant ex summons).
34. These cases are generally those in which the delay necessitated by obtaining
a warrant would allow the escape of a felon. As to the problem of arrest without a
warrant generally, see PLOSCOwE, Modern Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1955) ;
TREsoLINs, TAYLOR, BARNETT, Arrest Without Warrant: Extent and Social Implications,
46 J. CRIm. L. 187 (1955) ; HALL, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without Warrant,
49 HARV. L. REv. 566 (1936).
35. "In a M.S. note of a case of Williams v. Dawson, referred to by counsel in
Hobbs v. Braftscomb, 3 Camp. 420, Mr. Justice Buller laid down the law, that 'if a
peace officer of his own head takes a person into custody on suspicion, he must prove
that there was such a crime committed; but that if he receives a person into custody,
on a charge preferred by another of felony or breach of the peace, there he is to be
considered as a mere conduit, and if no felony or breach of the peace was committed,
the person who preferred the charge alone is answerable'." Doering v. State, 49 Ind.
56, 59 (1874). Accord, Venemon v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41, 20 N.E. 315 (1888); Black
v. Marsh, 31 Ind. App. 53, 67 N.E. 201 (1903).
36. Peace officers ". . . may arrest and detain any person found violating any
law of this state, until a legal warrant can be obtained." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1024
(Burns 1956). This statute permits the arrest of persons for misdemeanors, felonies, and
breaches of the peace committed in the presence of a peace officer. McGregor v. State,
200 Ind. 496, 163 N.E. 596 (1928). An officer cannot arrest for a misdemeanor not
committed in his presence; but can arrest for felonies on information which, under
the circumstances, lends a reasonable belief (a) that a felony has been committed
and (b) that the arrestee is the felon. Sisk v. State, 232 Ind. 214, 110 N.E.2d 627 (1952) ;
McGregor v. State, 200 Ind. 496, 163 N.E. 596 (1928) ; Hanger v. State, 199 Ind. 727,
160 N.E. 499 (1928) ; Robinson v. State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N.E. 891 (1925) ; Doering
v. State, 49 Ind. 56 (1874). But even this power does not allow the arrest of a person
on the mere suspicion of having committed a felony. Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648,
88 N.E.2d 386 (1949). Further, an officer cannot justify an unreasonable delay in
obtaining a warrant in order to investigate the case, Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64
N.E. 875 (1902) ; Matovina v. Hult, 125 Ind. App. 236, 123 N.E.2d 893 (1954), as prompt
arraignment is required. IND. CONsT. ART. I § 15.
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In contrast to statutes supplementing the arrest powers of peace
officers, powers granted to private citizens are a matter of common-
law. 7 A private citizen may arrest if a felony in fact has been com-
mitted in his presence and he has a reasonable belief in the guilt of the
suspect." A private citizen who arrests an innocent person upon infor-
mation supplied by another must prove that there was a felony com-
mitted, and that he held a reasonable belief as to the guilt of the suspect
at the time of the arrest. 9 This proof is made to the satisfaction of a
jury in a subsequent tort action testing the validity of the arrest."'
If a store is financially capable of employing agents vested with
police powers by statute or municipal ordinance,4 the broader arrest
powers may be utilized to great advantage.2 This type of protection is
beyond the reach of all but the larger stores because of the high wage
scale of competent protective agents." The speed of the crime com-
monly renders resort to the normal procedures for obtaining warrants
impossible.4 Furthermore, having a policeman other than a store de-
tective near at hand must be regarded as a fortuitous circumstance."
Due to the lack of recognition of any power aside from arrest by which a
suspect may be detained the storeowner must assume the risks of exer-
37. Kennedy v. State, 107 Ind. 144, 6 N.E. 305 (1886) ; Hopewell v. State, 22 Ind.
App. 489, 54 N.E. 127 (1898). More than merely possessing the power to arrest, a
citizen bears the right and the duty to prevent the commission of a felony even to the
extent of taking a life if necessary. Burns v. State, 192 Ind. 427, 136 N.E. 857 (1922).
38. Kennedy v. State, 107 Ind. 144, 6 N.E. 305 (1886).
39. Teagarden v. Graham, 31 Ind. 422 (1869) citing Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend.(N.Y.) 350 (1829) ; c.f. Doering v. State, 49 Ind. 56, (1874) (dicta approving the same
case) ; Simmons v. VanDyke, 138 Ind. 380, 37 N.E. 973 (1894). These would seem
to establish the proposition. But see Grand Rapids & Ind. Ry. Co. v. King, 41 Ind.
App. 701, 707, 83 N.E. 778, 780 (1908) (dicta to the effect that the person arrested
must be the felon).
40. Montgomery Ward v. Fogle, 221 Ind. 597, 50 N.E.2d 871 (1943) ; L. S. Ayres
v. Harmon, 56 Ind. App. 436, 104 N.E. 315 (1944).
41. Watchmen and conductors under IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1024 (Burns 1956);
additional fire and police forces, IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6108 (Burns 1950). Officers
and members of metropolitan police forces shall have all the powers of peace officers
except service of civil process. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6307. Merchant police may be
appointed under IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6312 (Burns 1950), and shall serve at the
expense of the applicant for one year performing duties at the place designated by the
commissioners.
42. This relieves the "proof of felony" requirement, but the employer is still
liable for the tortious acts of the detective. Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N.E.
506 (1893) ; L. S. Ayres v. Harmon, 56 Ind. App. 436, 104 N.E. 315 (1914).
43. To this cost must be added that of bonding. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6314 (Burns
1950).
44. Out of 688 shoplifting incidents reported during the years 1954-1955, the report-
ing police departments effected 649 arrests. Of these arrests, 13 were made with a
warrant. Police Survey.
45. Only two police departments in Indiana maintain permanent shoplifting details
circulating in the shopping district-Evansville, Indianapolis. Police Survey. Several
others do place a detail on this duty during the holiday shopping increase. Ibid.
NOTES
cising his private arrest powers. Because of the policy of limiting the
employees who may apprehend a suspect, rarely does the person who saw
the taking make the arrest. Therefore, the store must generally assume
the burden of showing that the person arrested was the thief." Even
if successful in such proof, stores so fear the adverse publicity inevitably
attendant in a suit for false arrest that they tend to settle out of court
for sums far in excess of reasonable damages.4"
It has been estimated that nearly fifteen million dollars worth of
goods is lost to shoplifters every year in the state of Indiana."' Only
when the retailer's inventory shrinkage exceeds that of competitors is
he forced to absorb the loss himself." Therefore the loss in the main is
46. Due to the necessities of modern merchandising and the tremendous volume
of sales, a running inventory on each item for the most is impractical. Interview, Store
Executive. It is patently difficult to prove the felonious intent necessarily associated
with a taking to complete a felony without finding the article concealed about the
suspect and proving that he took it. Some small specialty shops stocking more expensive
items do keep running inventories and they would need prove only that something was
stolen to justify a detention. Some attempt is made in apparel sections to note empty
hangers, but shoplifters often take hangers and all. Interview, Store Detective.
47. As an example of this type of adverse publicity, South Bend Tribune, -Oct.
13, 1955, § 3, p. 1, col. 4.
48. This estimate is made in full recognition of the futility of any hope for accuracy
in a lump sum estimate. The method employed in the Questionnaire was to ask the polled
stores to classify themselves into the categories of retail establishments used in compil-
ing the U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, RETAIL
TRADE, INDIANA (Series PR-1-14 Jan. 1956), and then answer the question: "What
per cent of the gross sales (retail value) is your shoplifting loss?" Charts were then
made of the answers from each store and the percentage for each store type was found
by weighting each percentage given by the number of stores claiming that percentage
loss. The percentage then attributed to the store type was multiplied by the total sales
for that type of establishment in Indiana during the year 1954. id. at Table A, p. 3, #5.
The products were then added. Such a procedure does not consider in weighting the
percentage attributable to the store type the relative portion of the particular store's
contribution to total sales made for that store type throughout Indiana. Therefore,
whereas the percentage itself would be representative for the state, the estimated total
loss would not. The returns from some store types were small in comparison to the
numbers of establishments; but these types were those which suffered the least problem.
The return "neglible" was assigned a weight of 'I of 1%. In toto, this estimate is
felt to be conservative, but indicative of the dollar volume which can be assumed to
be involved.
Type Average % Loss Total Sales Loss
I. Food Y/ $980,930,000.00 $4,904,650.00
II. Hardware 2 432,212,000.00 2,156,060.00
III. Gen'l Mer. 1. 488,865,000.00 4,888,650.00
IV. Apparel, Acc. Y4 239,249,000.00 598,127.50
V. Furn. Appl. 3/4 224,021,000.00 560,052.50
VI. Drug, Prop. 2 147,438,000.00 737,190.00
VII. Other (Jewelry) Y4 391,162,000.00 977,905.00
2,903,877,000.00 $14,822,635.00
49. The writer has been unable to find any insurance company underwriting shop-
lifting loss alone. However, if the assured carries mercantile open stock burglary insur-
ance, then it is possible in some cases to endorse the policy to cover open stock theft.
From an insurance company's view, this is an extremely hazardous risk, and can be
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passed on to the honest customer.5" The reduction of the economic loss
consequent from this situation is only one phase of the problem. A valid
preventative measure must be directed at the source of the problem-the
shoplifter himself.
The name shoplifter is descriptive of little but the locale of the
crime and conveys nothing of the universal character of the participants.
Still, an understanding of the drives behind the theft enables a rational
classification to be made based upon the motive of the thief. Shoplifters
stealing for resale through criminal marketing channels can be classed
as professionals, in distinction from amateurs who steal for family use,
personal use, or for juvenile prestige. In the parlance of the trade the
professional class is divided into "heels," whose sole support is derived
from shoplifting, and "boosters," whose major occupation is some other
area of crime, or who are narcotics addicts or alcoholics." In the same
parlance amateurs are lumped together as "snitches," but can be more
realistically dealt with as adults and juveniles. 2
The heel is a member of an ancient criminal trade in which the
basic modus operandi has remained unchanged since the early days of
permanent mercantile establishments. In the furtherance of a constant
purpose of stealing articles of high value at a minimum of risk, many
heels operate in groups of highly organized specialists.54 Typically a
decoy diverts the attention of the store agents by causing a disturbance
underwritten on very few classes. Where it is written the cost is generally an addi-
tional 75% of the open stock burglary, safe burglary, and interior robbery rates.
Mere disappearance is not a loss covered thereby. Neither is any shortage disclosed by
an inventory covered, unless such shortage can reasonably be shown to have been
occasionedby robbery, theft, or an attempt there at. Even then, an amount equal to the
average shortage as revealed by the last five annual physical inventories, increased
or decreased by the percentage of increase or decrease, if any, in the total gross sales
for the 12 month period immediately preceding the discovery of the loss, as compared
to the average annual sales for the period represented by the physical inventories, is de-
ducted from the amount of determined loss. Letters from Insurance Underwriters on
file in Office of the Indiana Law Journal.
50. Inventory shrinkage is the difference between the amount realized on the sale
and the retail price. It includes short shipments, markdowns, etc. aside from theft loss.
Therefore, it is quite difficult to assign a particular amount of the gross difference
to shoplifting. NATIONAL RETAIL DRY GOODS ASSOCIATION, CONTROLLING SHORTAGES
AND IMPROVING PROTECTION 46 (1953).
51. CAMERON, DEPARTMENT STORE SHOPLIFTING 26 (unpublished thesis in Indiana
University Library 1953). This work was prepared on the basis of records, operations,
interviews, and experiences gathered in a large Chicago department store. It was
supplemented by court records and official statistics and submitted in partial satisfaction
for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy at Indiana University. It is undoubtedly one of the
most perceptive and intense studies of the specific field in existence.
52. Ibid.
53. In 1597 thieves were using the same basic diversionary techniques as are
contemporarily utilized. JUDGES, THE ELIZABETHAN UNDERWORLD 170 (1930).
54. Interview, Police Chief; Store Detectives.
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demanding immediate attention, while the other members of the team
engage in a rapid wholesale theft of valuable merchandise. There are,
of course, heels that prefer to work alone employing a variety of ruses
to distract the clerk. 5 The habitat of the heel is generally in the larger
urban areas where he is able to prey upon department stores and specialty
shops stocking high value merchandise. There are indications however
that certain groups make a circuit of the smaller towns in the Indian-
apolis and the Chicago marketing areas."
With the increase in narcotics addiction in recent years, the booster
has become more of a problem than formerly." The addict at odds with
the fantastically high daily cost of drugs may resort at time to shop-
lifting to supplement his income." Alcoholics are quite likely to confine
their thefts to liquor, as it is more readily available than drugs.59 Prosti-
tutes, pickpockets, and panderers complete the professional class by oc-
casionally turning to this type of crime to supplement income.
Although professional thieves are not numerically significant and do
not cause an overall loss comparable to that attributed to amateurs," much
of the larger stores' success in dealing with the problem seems to have
been against the professional.61 This success is largely a result of the
55. CAMERON, op. cit. supra note 51 at 28-32. For pictorial explanations of methods
utilized by professionals and accomplished amatuers, e.g. booster skirts, false shopping
bags, prestidigitation. See MINN. RETAIL FEDERATION, op. cit. supra note 15; NATIONAL
RETAIL DRY GOODS ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra note 50 at app. A.
56. Reports from the police in a 50 mile radius of Indianapolis indicate that
professional rings operating ordinarily in that city make a semi-annual circuit of towns
such as Bloomington, Richmond, Logansport, and Anderson. Generally, by the time the
police get word from the merchants the thieves are out of town. Interviews, Police;
Merchants. Police Survey.
57. It can no longer be denied that narcotics and shoplifting are inextricably
intertwined. Although the survey indicates that only two Indiana cities have police
chiefs convinced of this statement, these two cities are also the ones with the largest
problems in connection with the professional thief. Police Survey.
58. With the average cost of the narcotics habit listed at $35 per day, there are
instances where people earning over $2-00 per week must supplement their income by
illegal activity. Hearings Before tie U.S. Senate Special Committee on. Organized
Crime, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 14 at 281, 435, 453, et seq. (1951).
For an excellent treatment, see Prosser, The Narcotic Problem, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
405 (1954).
59. The theft of wine from grocery stores is the typical crime. Merchant Survey,
Letters from Grocery Store operators to the Indiana Law Journal on file in the Office
of the Indiana Law Journal.
60. Professional shoplifters are generally credited with only 10% of the thefts
taking place. CAMERON, op. cit. supra note 51 at 42; NATIONAL RETAIL DRY GOODS
Assoc., op. cit. supra note 50 at 58. In Indiana, only in the apparel and accessory type
establishment did professional thievery approach that attributed to amateur theft. But
the loss from the individual professional theft is higher. While one professional was
in prison, the inventory shrinkage in a suit department was reduced $4000 per year.
CAMERON op. cit. supra note 51 at 42.
61. Detectives can be placed proximate to counters displaying high value mer-
chandise, with confidence that this will be the target of professional forays. Such
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competency of store detectives as a group and the cooperative exchange
of information among them. A store detective who discovers that his
store has been "hit" immediately relays information concerning the loss
and a description of the suspect to the other stores in the area and the
police. Running files are kept on each known professional and the thief
is quickly identified by physical characteristics or by the methodology of
the theft. The identification system is not, according to available in-
formation, organized on a nationwide basis, except through the facilities
of police reporting and the private files of some large chains.62
If professionals were the only problem to be met, then penalties for
shoplifting could be made so severe that shoplifting would cease to be
profitable because of the risk. Today, shoplifters can be convicted and
imprisoned for ten years under Indiana statutes.63 Cost-conscious store
owners, however, prosecute known professionals in courts of limited jur-
isdiction, where the accused is fined, sentenced as a misdemeanant, or
released.6 4 Such a professional soon returns to his trade, perpetuating
the problem. Store detectives certainly have an immediate value in the
store not only as an available arm of the law but as a preventive force.6"
Nevertheless, they are of equal value in court testifying as to crimes
already committed. If merchants sincerely desire a lessening of pro-
fessional shoplifting, the professional must be prosecuted in a court of
general jurisdiction where he may be convicted for the felony committed.
Admittedly prosecutions of this nature will require the store detective
to spend days in court in which he will be absent from the store; but this
time, in the long run, is well spent.66 A policy of convicting the profes-
sional shoplifter for felonies could create an unbearable risk for profes-
sional operations in this state.
No classification of society by age, wealth, sex, locale, or environ-
ment excludes the amateur shoplifter. Children, matrons, professional
men, businessmen, and workers skilled and unskilled commit the crime.
Amateur thievery is not centralized in the large urban areas but is found
prior planning is not possible with the amateur who does not concentrate on high value
merchandise. Interviews, Store Detectives.
62. Interviews, Store Detective.
63. See note 2 supra.
64. Interviews, Store Executives; Store Detectives. It was said that 60 to 90 days
was the normal duration of the incarceration if the offender was sentenced. Ibid.
65. This is borne out by the fact that stores often employ uniformed police despite
the fact that the usual attire of a store detective is street clothes. Further, professionals
have a high respect for the efficiency of some detectives and avoid their stores. Inter-
views, Store Detective.
66. A person convicted of three felonies is deemed a habitual criminal and is
subject to life imprisonment. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2207 (Burns 1956).
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throughout the state in every class of city and town.6" The general pub-
lic thinks of shoplifting as a woman's crime. But in fact, the type of
store and the age of its normal clientele probably determine the pre-
dominate sex of the shoplifter.68 The general merchandise group and
apparel shops indicate a clear majority of women offenders; but the rest
of the store types report that males definitely predominate as the source
of their particular shoplifting problem.69
Shoplifters able to pay for goods that they steal are often tolerated
by merchants because the utter senselessness of the theft seems to indi-
cate mental instability.7" Some medical authority credits kleptomania as
possibly being a symptom of the criminal psychopath,7 who does not
ordinarily respond to psychiatric treatment and is for the most part in-
curable.72 Fortunately, the criminal psychopath is quite rare in society
and those psychopaths exhibiting their disturbances by kleptomania are
rarer still.7 ' Kleptomania may also be symptomatic of a neurotic im-
pulse .7  Such an impulse is the result of a mental condition that ordi-
narily does respond to psychiatric treatment." Those persons suffering
from psychoneurotic impulses are perhaps more numerous than psycho-
paths, but the most common "kleptomaniacs" are "normal" people who
will not accept the responsibilities that community life imposes and steal
for gain and thrills. 6 It is suggested that of the many shoplifters com-
67. 98% of the questionnaires returned indicated that articles had been stolen.
100% of the general merchandise group reported thefts, as did food stores. Only one
druggist answered that he had escaped shoplifting. The vast majority of every store
type considers the amateur, rather than the professional, as the predominate offender.
Merchant Survey; see note 60 supra.
68. It is believed that age is the more critical factor, see note 81 infra.
69. Drugstores, hardware stores and furniture and appliance stores demonstrate
the clearest preponderance of male offenders. Merchant Survey.
70. 30% of the stores indicated encounters with kleptomaniacs, and others seemed
to believe that the difference between a kleptomaniac and a thief was the economic
status of the suspect. Merchant Survey. "So ingrained is the belief that petty theft by
adults is normally an index of poverty, that persons with any means whatever who
steal articles of little value are regarded as victims of kleptomania." HALL, THEFT,
LAW AND SOCIETY 308 (1st ed. 1935).
71. Wittels, Kleptomania and Other Psychopathic Crimes, 4 J. CRM. PsYcH. 205
(1942).
72. "The real psychopath offers unfavorable, although not entirely hopeless,
material for psychiatric treatment." GUITTMACHER, WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 104 (1951).
73. As the result of examining 9,958 cases in the Psychiatric Clinic of the Ct. of
Gen. Sessions, New York, between 1932 and 1936, 11.2% were diagnosed as psychopaths.
Bomberg, Thompson, Relation of Psychosis, Mental Defect and Personality to Crime,
28 J. CRIm L. & C. 70 at 75 (1937).
74. GUTTMACHER, op. cit. supra note 72 at 56.
75. Id. at 105.
76. Of 873 women officially charged with shoplifting in the Chicago Municipal
Court in the years 1948-1950, 57 were referred to the court psychiatric service. Of these,
twelve were suspected psychotics and but one was afflicted with a compulsive neurosis.
CAMERON, op. cit. supra note 51 at 118.
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monly termed kleptomaniacs, only a few truly deserve the name. The
rest should be considered legally responsible for their acts. For those
few who suffer from a mental problem, the law provides for treatment. 7
For the vast majority, if the consequences of exposure are made clear,
then recidivism can be expected to be low.7 1 In any case, tolerance does
not meet the problem.
Another prevalent misconception is seen in the belief that opulent
displays of merchandise produce an immediate uncontrollable urge to
steal. The use of diversionary techniques similar to those employed by
professionals that require prior thought and planning, in some measure,
disparages this idea. Further, shoplifters are often found with items
that complement one ensemble, which would seem to indicate that they
came to the store with the express purpose of stealing particular items.
Therefore, though open counter arrangements loaded with articles fa-
cilitate the theft, it is doubted that they engender it.79
Juvenile theft is the most serious phase of the crime in Indiana.
Losses attributed to this single source far exceed that of any other, adult,
amateur or professional. Stores throughout the state report heavy losses
in goods attractive to youthful values.8 " Mass forays conducted by chil-
77. If the defendant pleads insanity under IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1701 (Burns 1956),
then he shall be examined by two or three court appointed physicians. IxD. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-1702 (Burns 1956). If the court or jury find the defendant not guilty on the
ground of insanity, and if the court shall find that the defendant is insane, or if sane
that recurrence of such an attack is highly probable, then the defendant shall be com-
mitted to Beatty Memorial Hospital. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1704a (Burns 1956).
78. The initial apprehension is directed toward securing evidence of the theft.
The subsequent detention following the theft is directed toward convincing the amateur
that he or she is a thief. Interviews, Store Detective. Amateurs think of shoplifting
as something "naughty" rather than as a crime. If during the investigation, the amateur
comes to the realization that exposure as a criminal is imminent, panic strikes as
thoughts of how family and friends would react to the information come to his mind.
CAMERON, op. cit. supra note 51 at 176. One reason for the small number of prosecutions
of amateurs is the feeling in the trade that the amateur will not risk such an exposure
again. Interview, Store Detective. In the sample used by Cameron, only 2% of the
women and 6% of the men were ever detained more than once. Id. at 101.
79. Amateurs as well as professionals frequently use diversionary and concealment
techniques that require prior planning and thought. Booster boxes, skirts, and team-
work are not the exclusive property of the professional. Women are frequently found
in possession of complementary items from different stores. Merchant Survey. Inter-
views, Store Executive; Store Detective.
80. Apparel shops considered adults as the major problem. Two thirds of the
other stores regarded juveniles as the major problem. Juvenile theft was repeatedly
the subject of voluntary comment in the questionnaires. Drug stores are the hardest
hit by juveniles and they are also the only category which fears loss of goodwill more
than tort liability in dealing with suspects. See note 10 supra. Food stores of the self-
service type are plagued with losses due to rampages of small unattended children. The
value of the goods lost ranges from under $1.00 in Drug Stores to from $5.00-$10.00 in
Appliance stores; but as in all amateur shoplifting it is not the value of the particular
article, but the recurrence of the loss that hurts. The type of article stolen by juveniles
generally corresponds to sex and age desires. E.g., candy, lighters, billfolds, lipsticks,
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dren in stores are frustrating to the storeowner, who fears the legal and
social repercussions inherent in direct action."' Yet storeowners recog-
nize that juvenile pilferage, though larcenous, is not motivated solely by
the desire for gain. Rather it would seem to stem from an attempt on
the part of the youth to establish his status in juvenile society. 2 While
the thrill of accomplishing something for which there is a known penalty
without incurring the reaction of the law can and is experienced at this
age, the concept of private property and the necessity for its preservation
is not easily comprehended by a child on the threshold of communal re-
sponsibility. Still for the sake of society these concepts must be taught
at the earliest possible age." The merchant who endeavors to deal with
juvenile shoplifting by informing the parents of the offender often meets
little cooperation. Parental attitudes ranging from rage to outright in-
difference frustrate the merchant's attempts to impress the child with
communal responsibility.
It is manifest that presently in Indiana the mere statutory declara-
tion condemning larceny as a punishable crime does not have enough of
a prohibitory effect to offset the emasculating effect of the laws of ar-
rest and tort liability in the specific context of shoplifting. Indeed, shop-
lifting has become for practical purposes an unenforceable crime. Per-
haps it could be maintained that society merely wished to go on record
as disapproving such acts and had no interest in enforcement; but con-
sideration of the financial loss involved " and the effect on the youth of
the community renders this position untenable.8"
cosmetics, costume jewelry, and minor clothing items. The boy is the major offender
and his thefts have no doubt significantly affected the classification of shoplifters by
sex, see note 69 supra and accompanying text.
81. As an illustrative case, one return came from a store located directly across
from a High School in a small Indiana town. After finally apprehending one offender
with the aid of the police, it was learned that 17 other boys had been habitually stealing
from the same store. Merchant Survey.
82. Children often steal things which have no immediate value to them; but they
are always in the company of other juveniles. Merchant Survey. This phenomena was
also noted in CAMERON, op. cit. supra note 51 at 116. The quest for status is not merely
limited to that of the child group but can be stirred by desires for fuller familial
acceptance. NATIONAL RETAIL DRY GooDs Assoc. op. cit. supra note 50 at 20. (lecture
by Dr. Fabian Rouke). "Boys in a delinquency area are taught how to commit thefts
of various kinds. The boy who moves into an area at, say, the age of ten years without
previous experience in stealing has to learn many things in order to keep out of difficulty.
The other boys will show him how to steal ... " SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMIN-
OLOGY 233 (5th ed. Cressy 1955).
83. "A boy who is reared in an area of high delinquency reaches criminal maturity
at a very early age, perhaps by twelve or fourteen. He has reached criminal maturity
because criminality has become an integrated part of his personality...." SUTHERLAND,
op. cit. supra note 82 at 219.
84. See note 48 spra.
85. Just as truancy may be an indication of the beginning of a delinquent career,
so a delinquent career often is the training ground for adult crime. See SHAw, McKAY,
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Any contemplated statutory solution must of necessity have as its
primary purpose the preservation of individual rights in their present
preferred position while still effectively coping with the specific need.
Several attempts have been previously made to solve the particular prob-
lem engendered by shoplifting. The methods employed include broaden-
ing the powers of arrest, the creation of a new crime, and easing the
evidentiary requirements for conviction of those accused of shoplifting.
A statute that enlarges a citizen's powers of arrest disturbs the balance
of individual liberty by clothing private persons with government power
which does not always include the same tempering influence of reason-
ableness that is a checkrein in private actions."6 The creation of particu-
lar crimes such as "wilful concealment of merchandise" would seem only
to substitute new problems of proof for old.8" The twisting of vagrancy
statutes so as to include shoplifters within the definition of "vagrant"
broadens the statutes beyond their justifiable limits." To enact a statute
which relies heavily upon presumptions operating against the accused
and forces the accused to come forward with evidence of innocence rides
a narrow line of constitutionality under the fourteenth amendment."
Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas (1942). But "the study of concrete facts,
notably the works of such criminologists as S. and E. Glueck, Grassberger, and Frey,
reveals that, of the numbers of young delinquents brought before a court, a small
percentage only (about 10%-20%) tends to prolong delinquency into adult years. That
means that about 80%-90% of the juvenile delinquents brought before a court will not
offend again, or at least will not retain their delinquent tendencies beyond the crisis
of their juvenile adaption." (Emphasis added.) BovET, PsYcHIATRIc ASPECTS OF
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 44 (United Nations World Health Organization Monograph
Ser. No. 1, 1951).
86. Illinois recently attempted to enact a statute that broadened the powers of
private arrest for a crime against private property. The proposed bill was vetoed on the
basis of the Illinois Attorney General's finding that the ". . . statute authorized not
only the arrest of innocent persons by private citizens, but also the right of search and
seizure even to the point of maiming or killing. . . ." Veto message from Governor
William C. Stratton to the 69th General Assembly of Illinois on H.B. 778 (1955).
Copy on file in the office of The Indiana Law Journal.
87. Maine has enacted a statute making "willful concealment of merchandise"
a misdemeanor. ME. REV. STAT. c. 132, § 10-A (1955 Supp.). Even though goods con-
cealed upon the person constitute primie faciae evidence of willful concealment, the
problems of proving intent and justifying the original apprehension would seem to
remain the same.
88. E.g., A person known to be a pickpocket, thief, or confidence operator found
loitering near a store or shop is a vagrant and punishable as such. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-61-1 (1953). For variations, see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7101 (1947); ILL. REV.
STAT. c. 38 § 578 (1955) ; IOWA CODE c. 55 § 746.1 (1950); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4602
(Burns 1956) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.520 (1950) ; MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 750.167, 750.168
(1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-35-248 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 4821
(1939). Another method ,is to pattern a Statute after 12 ANNE STAT. 1 c. 7 (1713)
which punished larceny from a dwelling house as a distinct offense. Stores, shops, and
warehouses are now generally included under this type of statute. E.g., MIcH. Comp.
LAwS § 750.360 (1948).
89. A So. Carolina statute makes the finding of merchandise concealed upon the
person primie faciae evidence of willful concealment. A person willfully taking posses-
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Basically, statutes such as these embrace the notion that conduct such as
wilful concealment and loitering is, in and of itself, so deleterious to
society as to warrant proscription in its own right."0
The shoplifting situation in Indiana clearly does not warrant
measures as stringent as these. If the present laws of arrest and lar-
ceny are not sufficient and have become intrinsically misadjusted to the
social needs of the state, then those laws should be amended on their
own merits and not for the purpose of indirectly attacking a particular
problem such as shoplifting. Further, if juveniles are the focal point for
a corrective statute, stiffer penalties and easy convictions would not nor-
mally be considered either desirable or effective.9' Difficulties of proof
of the crime are significant to the merchant only as obstacles to be
hurdled in avoiding tort liability. It is suggested that no statute altering
the present status of arrest or redefining the crime of larceny is feasible;
but that legislative effort should be directed toward the juvenile problem
and some alleviation of tort liability.
When property is taken from a store, a merchant's immediate in-
terest is in regaining his property. His interest in punishment for the
theft stems from a hope to deter future thefts. Therefore, when store-
owners detain a suspected customer they are primarily forwarding a pri-
vate interest rather than one of a public nature. If a private person
without privilege detains another in the furtherance of a private interest,
a false imprisonment results and not a false arrest. A false arrest only
occurs when a detention is made under a supposed public authority which,
in fact, does not exist. A false imprisonment is, of course, negated if
the detention is made in the reasonable exercise of a private privilege.92
At common-law a property holder, such as a merchant or his em-
ployee, had two privileges in connection with the chattels in his posses-
sion: the privilege to recapture chattels wrongfully taken and the privi-
lege to defend chattels in his possession from wrongful or felonious dis-
sion of merchandise with an intention to conceal is guilty of the offense of shoplifting.
So. CAR. ACTS 1956, No. 838. (effective Mar. 19, 1956). If common experience denies
a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact to be presumed, an
inference from one to the other is arbitrary and will not sustain a statutory presumption.
Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 465 (1943).
90. See HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw, 213 (1947).
91. SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 82 at 312.
92. C.f. The following explanation of the basis of these privileges. "He is allowed
freedom of action because his own interests, or those of the public, require it, and social
policy will best be served by permitting it. The boundaries of the privilege are marked
out by current ideas of what will most effectively promote the general welfare."
PROSSER, TORTS, § 16 at 79 (2d ed. 1955).
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possession.93 The privilege to recapture chattels could only be exercised
on fresh pursuit, and the pursuer acted at his peril."4 The privilege to
defend possession from a wrongful or felonious dispossession, like the
privilege of self-defense, was based upon the circumstances as they would
appear to a reasonable man. Under the privilege of defense of posses-
sion, therefore, there is a narrow area in which a reasonable mistake can
be made.95 In the use of both privileges the necessity for the use of
force was recognized but regulated under principles of reasonableness.
If the storeowner and his employees are to be allowed to make rea-
sonable mistakes in detaining customers innocent of any taking, then the
93. Branston, The Forcible Recaption of Chattels, 28. L.Q. REv. 262, 263 (1912).
The privilege to recapture owed its continued existence to the lengthy, cumberous court
procedure that constituted the alternative to self redress at common law. Id. at 265. At
first only a momentary dispossession justified action, but the concept of "fresh pursuit"
today would seem to include "prompt and persistent efforts to recover the property."
PROSSER, TORTS § 24 at 100 (2d ed. 1955).
94. PaOSSER, TORTS, § 24 at 100 (2d ed. 1955). A narrower view prevails in Indiana.
A storeowner or his agent may seize goods and take them into possession wherever
found, provided he does not breach the peace or violate any other law. If he recaptures
goods which do not belong to him, he will be a trespasser ab initio and liable to the
persori whose goods are wrongfully taken. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Moline
Plow Co., 13 Ind. App. 225, 41 N.E. 480 (1895). Further, if a shoplifter without force
takes goods and holds them peaceably though wrongfully, the owner of the property
cannot exercise his right of recaption by means of violence on the person of the
possessor; the remedy lies in a resort to law. Andre v. Johnson, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 375
(1843) ; Singer Mch. Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N.E. 793 (1911). Deadly force
is never justified in the recapture of property. There is good authority for the proposi-
tion that reasonable force can be used where there has been a mere momentary inter-
ruption of possession and also where the pursuit was immediate and fresh. PROSSER,
TORTS, § 24 at 100. This is justified on the basis that the distinction between the defense
of possession and recaption at this point is narrow, (especially so in the case of shop-
lifting) and in the case of chattels a summary remedy is the only way to save the goods
from loss or destruction, Branston, supra note 93 at 269-270, but a demand for the
chattel must precede any use of force, id. at 271. See also, RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
§§ 100-106 (1934). The right to use reasonable force to defend possession has always
been a part of the common law. Branston, supra note 93 at 268. As an outgrowth of the
law of self defense, it may be exercised on the basis of apparent necessity. PROSSER,
op. cit. supra at § 21. Possession of personal property is sufficient to authorize the
holder to protect such possession against a mere trespasser. Moorman v. Quick, 20 Ind.
67 (1863) ; Dedrick v. Brandt, 16 Ind. App. 264, 44 N.E. 1010 (1896). See RESTATEMENT
TORTS. §§ 77, 87 (1934).
95. The definition of possession therefore would seem to be vital. If the possession
of the store owner was concomitant with the store premises, then only action outside
the store would be in the exercise of the privilege to recapture and at peril. E.g. Mont-
gomery Ward v. Fogle, 221 Ind. 597, 50 N.E.2d 871 (1943) (apprehension outside
the store). Logically it would seem that even mistaken action taken within the store,
if reasonable and based on apparent necessity, would be a privileged defense of possession,
but this is not the case. See Efroymson v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 451, 63 N.E. 328 (1902)
(apprehension within the store). Therefore, the conclusion follows that the possession
of the store is ended when the customer picks up the article, and, from that point on the
store must act, aside from arrest, under the privilege to recapture at the peril of detaining
an innocent shopper. Comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887, 892 (1952). Theoretically, whether
or not the thief took possession would determine if a larceny or merely an attempted
larceny was committed. But see People v. Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560
(1943).
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statutory creation of such a privilege should evolve from a recognition
of the already existent privileges of defense and recaption of property
and embody the best attributes of both.96 To be effective such legisla-
tion must permit a storeowner who has reasonable grounds for suspect-
ing that he is being dispossessed to examine a customer, but only if the
examination is conducted in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable
length of time." Further, it should recognize that some force may
necessarily be required to detain and strictly limit such force to the needs
of the detention, prohibiting the use of deadly force." Artificial defi-
nitions of the scope of the storeowner's possession must not be allowed
to constrict the operation of the privilege to detain to the boundaries of
the store premises. The opportunity to resort to normal legal procedure
is just as infrequent when the apprehension is made within the store as
when made without. The following statute is designed to meet these ends.
A BILL
for an ACT creating a privilege to detain suspected shoplifters.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Indiana;
Section 1. A merchant believing with probable cause that a
wrongful taking has occurred, or is occurring, may
detain the person arousing such belief for a rea-
96. California in Collyer v. Kress, 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 Pac. 2d 20 (1936) gave
recognition to such a right by holding that a storeowner may detain for a reasonable
time in which to make a reasonable investigation in a reasonable manner when he has
probable cause to believe that someone is stealing, or has stolen from him. Bettolo v.
Safeway Stores, 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936). Probable cause for the deten-
tion falls within the province of judicial determination, while reasonableness of the de-
tention remains with the jury. Roberson v. J. C. Penny Co., 288 P.2d 275 (Cal. App.
1955). Note, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 269 (1956).
97. California's forthright recognition of the privilege to detain through the use
of reasonable force was the first of its nature, Collyer v. Kress, 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d
20 (1936) ; but several jurisdictions recognize that probable cause will reduce damages.
Hill v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 93, 82 S.E.2d 35 (1954); Lewis v. Montgomery Ward and
Co., 144 Kan. 656, 62 P.2d 875 (1936) ; Note, 15 J. KAt. B.A. 292 (1946). This had been
foreshadowed by decisions to the effect that detentions to investigate were allowable.
Jacques v. Child's Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 277, 142 N.E. 50 (1924). It is, however,
questionable whether a detention in fact existed in that case because an exit was open
to the customer. See also, Lester v. Albers Super Market, 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d
529 (1954) (no restraint). This meant that a detention was proper if consensual, which
would be, in effect, no detention. Nevertheless the California position has been adopted
by case law, Swafford v. Vermillion, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953) ; Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W.2d 361 (1945) ; Teel v. May Dept. Store
Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74 (1941) ; and by statute, FLA. STAT. § 811.022 (1955).
This statute was based upon one presented in Note, 62 YALE L.J. 788 (1953). Letter
from David 0. Tumin, Special Assistant Attorney General of Florida, to the Indiana
Law Journal, Sept. 6, 1955,. on file in the Office of the Indiana Law Journal.
98. See statute § 1 infra.
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sonable time, in a reasonable manner. The deten-
tion shall be for the purpose of
a) regaining property, or
b) informing the appropriate public officials en-
dowed with a peace officer's power of ar-
rest, or
c) informing private persons interested in the
welfare of the suspect.
Reasonable force, but not deadly force, may be
used to detain.
Section 2. A merchant in informing the public official of the
circumstantial basis for the detention shall be as-
sumed to be placing information before the offi-
cial, and there shall be a presumption against such
information constituting a charge of crime.
Section 3. If, under all the circumstances, a reasonable man
would not disbelieve the information provided by
the merchant, then such information shall provide
a reasonable basis for an arrest by a public official.
Section 4. The provisions of this act shall not apply to crimi-
nal prosecutions.
Section 5. Nothing in this act shall affect any cause of action
which has accrued prior to the effective date of
this act.
Section 6. Whereas an emergency exists for the immediate
taking effect of this act, the same shall take effect
from and after its passage.
This statute creates a privilege to detain which will permit a rea-
sonable mistake in the detention of a customer, if under the circum-
stances, a reasonable man would have made the same mistake. In this
it resembles privileges previously categorized as private.9 The merchant
need not fear an action for false arrest unless in informing the peace
officer he explicitly makes a charge of crime. The privilege allows the
storeowner to garner enough information in the course of the detention
to enable an officer to determine whether or not an arrest should be made
under all the circumstances. The merchant need fear an action for false
imprisonment only if in detaining the suspect he abused his privilege.
The merchant's action subsequent to the initial detention must be reason-
able whether or not the suspect took the goods. The merchant's high
99. See note 30 supra.
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valuation of customer goodwill may insure against irresponsible deten-
tions, and the statute further restrains breaches of community standards
by providing for a jury determination of probable cause and reasonable-
ness.
CONCLUSION
Shoplifting and its concomitant social and economic effects upon
the State of Indiana demand legislative treatment. 0 The scope of the
change must afford room for differential treatment that can meet the
hetrogeneous nature of the offenders. A private privilege to detain
could be utilized to advantage by providing a means by which property
can be protected and the processes of the law can be brought to bear on
the problem. Innocence can still be adequately protected through the
judicial and community standard of reason; but must not be to the
stultifying extent that it is presently. The suggested statute provides
a workable solution by eliminating tort liability for reasonable detaining
action taken by a merchant better enabling both him and the community
to reduce the causes and effects of this crime.
WATER RIGHTS IN INDIANA
Endowed with abundant rainfall and ample flowing water supply,
Indiana has never faced a general water shortage.' In fact, the great
100. In construing IND. ANN. STAT. § 17-832 (Burns 1940) (limited damages re-
coverable from certain officials for false arrest), it was said, "Within the limits
necessary for the preservation of our form of federal and state governments and the
basic principles upon which they rest, the Constitutions of both state and nation must
be construed to the end that public progress and development will not be stifled and
that public problems, with their ever increasing complexity, may be met and solved to the
best interests of the public generally." Scoopmire v. Taflinger, 114 Ind. App. 419, 428,
52 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1943).
1. "Being located in the more humid part of the midwest, Indiana is not faced
with a problem of insufficient total quantity of water being available, but one of having
the right amount available in the right place at the right time. Of the water that falls
on Indiana as rain or snow, only about 30 per cent is available for use by man. The
remainder is evaporated back into the atmosphere. Only a portion of the 30 per cent
can be put to practical use, because unequal distribution throughout the year produces
excessive quantities during some periods and deficient amounts during others. Nature
attempts in a limited way to equalize the availability of water by storing great quantities
in the ground during the periods of plenty and releasing them gradually throughout
the year. However, the natural underground reservoirs are not uniformly distributed
throughout the state, with the result that some areas are not as plentifully supplied
as others. Increases in population, expansion of industry, and intensification of agri-
culture are continually placing a greater and greater demand on available water supplies.
In the areas of inadequate natural storage, continued growth and development are being
hampered and even stopped." INDIANA FLOOD CONTROL AND WATER RESOURCES COMt-
